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Does Brazil Have the Right to Truth?
Glafira Marcon
International Studies Senior Seminar: Order and Chaos in Global Affairs
Macalester College
December 14, 2012
Brazil established its first truth commission in November 2011, which
seeks to uncover the human rights abuses committed during the military
dictatorship from 1964 to 1985. Although no international treaty or
convention explicitly recognizes the right to truth, regional precedent
suggests that it is a human rights norm. The Truth Commission faces the
following barriers: the Amnesty Law protects perpetrators of human
rights violations on either side of the conflict, tensions exist between the
Brazilian Supreme Court and the regional human rights court, and
politically strong military officials still present in the Brazilian
government actively block the Truth Commission’s access to information.
This paper reviews academic work on truth commissions and the right to
truth, compares the events leading up to the Truth Commissions in Brazil
and Argentina, and explore the hurdles to information in order to
answer, does Brazil have the right to truth?
1. Introduction
In November 2011, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff signed Law Nº 12.528,
establishing the country’s first truth commission. The Truth Commission will analyze the human
rights abuses committed during the military dictatorship from 1964 to 1985, abuses that included
kidnapping, torture, homicide, and the concealment of these crimes. The Truth Commission,
however, is facing a series of setbacks in uncovering what happened. First of all, the Amnesty
Law protects perpetrators of human rights violations on either side of the conflict. Second, there
are inconsistencies in the legality of the Amnesty Law according to the Brazilian Supreme Court
and the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (IACHR). The Supreme Court of Brazil ruled
that the Amnesty Law was constitutional and a political question that could be repealed only in
Parliament, while the IACHR condemned the Amnesty Law as inconsistent with the American
Convention of Human Rights. Third, the politically strong military officials still present in the
Brazilian government actively block the Truth Commission’s access to information. This raises
the question: does Brazil have the right to truth?
Although the right to truth isn’t an explicitly recognized universal human right under
treaties or conventions, it is an emerging concept and legal process that Brazil adopted due to
internal demand and pressure from peer countries and international mandates. As Brazil tries to
follow regional precedent by instituting a truth commission, it needs to consider the experiences
of its neighbors, such as Argentina, in navigating the intersections of national and regional laws,
as well as emerging universal human rights concepts.
Section 2 of this paper will present a comprehensive review of academic work on truth
commissions and the right to truth – from general legal justifications for establishing truth
commissions, to discussions of whether or not there is a Right to Truth. Section 3 of this paper
will discuss the pertinent aspects of the historical background leading up to the Truth
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Commission in Brazil, including a recount of the military dictatorship, as well as explanations of
the Amnesty Law, the Supreme Court ruling on the Law, and the dissent from the InterAmerican Human Rights Commission. Section 4 will discuss the current state of the Truth
Commission, present the goal of this paper, and illuminate the barriers and obstacles facing the
Truth Commission. Section 5 illustrates jurisdictional issues between domestic laws and
international treaties. In Section 6, I compare the experience of the Truth Commission in Brazil
with the Truth Commission in Argentina, and discuss lessons that can be taken away from the
comparison of the two cases. Section 7 focuses on possible actions Brazil can take to address the
obstacles facing the Truth Commission, followed by the implications and impacts of these
solutions. Finally, Section 8 seeks to answer: does Brazil have the right to truth?
2. Literature Review: The Right to Truth
The “right to truth” is an emerging concept in international human rights law, but it is by
no means enforced equally across nations (EAAF 2002). The body of literature on the explicit
right to truth is limited because although it is a developing principle of human rights, there is no
official universal right to truth in regional or international conventions. Scholars, countries, and
courts have justified enacting laws for truth commissions through articles of domestic
constitutions, as well as using provisions of regional and international treaties.
The Equipo Argentino de Antropoligía Forense (EAAF) describes the right to truth as
central to the project of confronting transitions to democracy by addressing the legacy of massive
human rights violations. The right to truth is implicit in international law and a part of the right
to justice, which entitles the families of disappeared persons to know the fate of their relatives
and imposes an obligation of investigation on states (EAAF 2002). The right to truth is distinct
from a normal penal process, however, in that it requires the state to investigate crimes but does
not actually apply penal law and punish the perpetrators of the crime.
The National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP) in Argentina
framed the right to truth as the obligation of the state to publicize the fate of disappeared persons
(Cuevas 2002). The Araguaia Guerrilla case in Brazil portrayed a new dimension of the right to
the truth that shed light on ‘truth’ in terms of freedom of information – not only as an individual
right of the victims, but also as a collective right of society (Melo 2012).
The truth commission is one way that the conceptual right to truth has materialized.
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Uruguay and other countries have encouraged
the emergence of truth commissions as one way through which countries attempt to come to
terms with the past, by investigating large-scale human rights violations and incentivizing
perpetrators to come forward and tell what really happened. The American Convention on
Human Rights (IACHR) protects the right to life, the right to humane treatment, and the right to
personal liberty, which were avenues of reasoning used by Argentina, Peru, and Chile in order to
legally establish their respective truth commissions (Filho 2012).
Truth commissions have (1) provided victims with psychological support as well as
monetary reparation for crimes committed against them, (2) upheld the right of victims’ families
to know about the violence perpetrated against their kin, and (3) publicly acknowledged the
victims’ version of events. Truth commissions were especially beneficial for the civil society at
large by (4) pointing out the institutional failures that might have contributed to the gross
violations of human rights, (5) making recommendations to preclude these violations from
occurring again, (6) fostering a spirit of human rights, and (7) reinforcing the importance of
transparent governmental institutions (Filho 2012).
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The annual International Day for the Right to Truth on March 24, established by the UN
General Assembly, is another embodiment of the right to truth. On this day, countries recognize
the victims of atrocities, their right to know the fate of their family members, and to know who
committed the crime (ICTJ 2012).
Although the idea of the right to truth exists, there are numerous obstacles to fully
realizing this right. The right to truth is often conflated with, or difficult to distinguish from, the
rights to justice and reconciliation. Many argue that reconciliation provides the basis for
amnesty law, and is the “code word for those who want nothing done” (EAAF 2002, 131). One
example of this is amnesty laws. In Brazil, for example, the Amnesty Law of 1979 grants “total
and unrestricted amnesty” to all individuals involved in politically motivated crimes during the
dictatorship, including torture, kidnapping, and homicide (Filho 2012), and prohibits the
prosecution of perpetrators both from the state forces and the armed resistance.
This obstacle is exacerbated by inconsistencies between domestic law and the rulings of
regional/international courts. Discrepancies exist in Brazil between the Supreme Court and
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), as well as disagreement about the application
of the Amnesty Law within Brazil (Cabral 2012). In April 2010, the Brazilian Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the 1979 Amnesty Law. However, in December 2010, for the
second time the IACHR found that provisions of the Amnesty Law were incompatible with the
American Convention, and therefore unconstitutional (Filho 2012). As a result, it ordered the
Brazilian government to investigate the killing, torture, and disappearance of people during
military operations to eliminate resistance to the dictatorship – without having the actual
jurisdiction to do so.
This is one example of the push to include the right to truth in regional/international
conventions. Stances on the IACHR’s ruling vary; some believe that the Brazilian law is final,
some claim that the IACHR is mightier, while other leaders view the IACHR as a proxy for US
imperialism and a biased judicial body exceeding its jurisdiction (Picq 2012). It has had to
investigate matters presidents would rather keep secret, and there is evidence that countries
change their opinion on the IACHR depending on whether their stances on certain issues align.
For example, President Rousseff’s administration strongly supported the IACHR ruling about the
Amnesty Law, invoking its authority and proclaiming the invaluable partnership. However,
Rousseff heavily criticized the court’s ruling concerning the construction of the Belo Monte dam,
and broke relations with the IACHR (Hayman 2011).
According to human rights scholars and practitioners, as well as journalists covering the
truth commission proceedings, the right to truth is at a stand still. In Brazil, the Supreme Court of
Brazil has ruled the Amnesty Law constitutional, but the president and the regional human rights
authority denounce the Amnesty Law and demand a fair and effective truth commission. In order
to determine whether Brazil has the right to truth, I will discuss the history of the Truth
Commission in Brazil, navigate questions of jurisdiction between domestic laws, those of the
IACHR, and international human rights law, and look at the precedents set by Brazil’s regional
neighbors – namely Argentina – to determine whether truth commissions are becoming the norm.
3. History of the Truth Commission in Brazil
This section focuses on historical events and laws that lead to the current state of the
Truth Commission in Brazil. Beginning with the coup d’état that established the military
dictatorship in Brazil, this historical recount will tell of the ensuing governments that reduced
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civil liberties, discuss the enactment of the 1979 Amnesty Law, and present the domestic and
regional tensions surrounding that law.
3.1 The Military Dictatorship in Brazil
President João Goulart came into office during a time of constitutional crisis1. As the leftwing Vice President of Brazil, Goulart succeeded President Janio Quadros following Quadros’
resignation just a few months after his election in 1960. Due to fears of Goulart’s alignment with
the Communist Party, the [Castelo Branco] military staged a coup d’état in 1964, deposing
President Goulart and setting up a military dictatorship in Brazil – the first in the region
(Monteconrado et al 2010). To suppress the threat of communist uprising in Brazil, the United
States supported the coup and overthrow of Goulart both strategically and financially (Globo
2006).
The Castelo Branco government presented itself as the defender of legality and in
opposition to communism. The government legitimized its military rule through revolutionary
rhetoric, and institutionalized it through a series of constitutional acts (Monteconrado et al 2010).
General Costa e Silva, who became president following the coup in 1967, led a government that
reduced civil liberties, increased media censorship, and faced violent opposition from left wing
groups (Monteconrado et al 2010). General Ernesto Geisel became president in 1974 and
introduced reforms that further limited political activity and elections (BBC 2012). It is during
these periods that the regime became openly dictatorial.
In between 1964 and 1985, the government acted against those under suspicion of being
affiliated with communist activities and those who violently opposed the military rule. Such
repression took the forms of political arrests, torture against those in state custody, forced
disappearances, summary executions, and hiding of corpses. The military also silenced and
overpowered leftist, peasant, and labor movements, establishing control over popular movements
and consequently weakening opposition (Mainwaring 1986). It is important to note that the
military government justified its actions through a guise of protecting “national security” from
“enemies of the state” (Filho 2012) – for the interpretation of this language comes into play when
categorizing these atrocities as acts of war versus violations of human rights.
3.2 Brazil’s Transition to Democracy and the Amnesty Law
Brazil began a slow transition into democracy in 1974, under the leadership of President
Ernesto Geisel. The military regime instituted this deliberate, gradual, and careful process of
political liberalization – also known as “abertura” – because they did not see military rule as a
stable and permanent solution, and saw the need to proceed along the Western values of
democracy (Mainwaring 1986). The regime opted to liberalize not because of its weaknesses, but
rather because of its economic and institutional strengths, and muscle over the opposition. The
regime initiated the transition to democracy for several reasons, an important one being the need
to unite the increasingly politicized institution of the military (Mainwaring 1986). The era of the
military regime brought economic growth and prosperity to Brazil, which created a paradoxical
complex: the parties that had opposed Goulart were the ones that benefitted most from the
1 Goulart was on an official trip to China at the time of Quadros’ resignation. The possibility of succession by
Goulart provoked the more conservative section of Congress to react, especially the military because they
considered him a populist politician who intended to include the communists in the alliance. The three military
ministers vetoed his return. But, with civil war imminent, Goulart was inaugurated in a parliamentary system of
government with diminished powers (Monteconrado et al 2010).
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economic growth, and were now the ones pushing for democratic and direct elections
(Mainwaring 1986). The military regime had kept several democratic institutions during the
dictatorship – such as political parties, elections, and a constitution – which proved to be an
important space of which the opposition to the military regime took advantage, and allowed
some continuity during the transition (Mainwaring 1986).
Every step during abertura provided new possibilities for the opposition and new limits
for the military regime. Popular movements began to gain momentum into the mid and late
1970s, and emerged stronger than ever, leading the military regime to take some precautionary
measures. The Amnesty Law of 1979 (Law Nº 6.683/1979) was signed into law during the
transition to democracy as a deliberate move to protect military actors during and after the
dictatorship. It gives total and unrestricted exoneration to all individuals involved in politically
motivated crimes committed between September 2, 1961 and August 15, 1979, including torture,
kidnapping, and homicide (Monteconrado et al 2010, Filho 2012). Although the law prohibits the
prosecution of perpetrators from both the state forces and the armed resistance, it
disproportionately benefits state agents who committed torture, homicide, and kidnappings by
giving them a jail out of free card. However, the law did remove the criminal status of former
"enemies of the state," and became decisive in the non-application of punitive measures against
such agents, allowing them to reintegrate into society (Monteconrado et al 2010).
Due to the military government’s instrumental position in the transition, its “success” in
restoring peace and order, and the boom in the economy brought by the regime, many military
government officials gained legitimacy and stayed in power as members of congress or Brazilian
municipality governments (Mainwaring 1986). Following the end of the military dictatorship in
1985, José Sarney became president. In 1995, Brazil adopted Law Nº 9140/95, which recognized
the state’s liability for deaths and disappearances during the military regime (Melo 2012). It did
not, however, repeal the Amnesty Law.
3.3 Supreme Court Ruling on the Amnesty Law
The left-wing group in Brazil – with a democratic government, the new 1988
Constitution, and a more informed civil society – escalated their open opposition to the Amnesty
Law’s legality. With the support of human rights groups and the administration of President Luiz
Inácio Lula da Silva (also known as Lula), the Brazilian Order of Lawyers (OAB) took the case
to the Brazilian Supreme Court in an effort to invalidate the law as incompatible with the 1988
Constitution. The OAB argued that, “The supreme court understood that the Amnesty Law
pardoned torturers, which in our view is regressive in relation to fundamental rights in the
Constitution and international conventions, which clearly indicate that torture is not a political
crime, but a common crime against humanity and, therefore, does not expire” (LAWR 2010,
p.9).
Under Direct Action of Unconstitutionality – an instrument that allows the Supreme
Federal Court of Brazil to judge the constitutionality of acts passed by the National Congress –
the Supreme Court reviewed the Amnesty Law, but military government lawyers argued that it
could not be changed retroactively because it was an “integral part of the country's reconciliation
process” (LAWR 2010, p.9). In April 2010, the Supreme Court agreed with this sentiment,
stating that torture was not a political crime, but did fall into the “related crime” category, and
emphasized that it was not within the Court’s jurisdiction to alter the law (LAWR 2010).
To make matters more complicated, current president Dilma Rousseff herself was a
victim of torture during the military regime, and very openly opposes the Amnesty Law and
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supports the Truth Commission in Brazil (Cabral 2012). Although the Supreme Court of Brazil
upheld the law, Rousseff challenges the legality of the ruling by siding with regional and
international commissions and conventions that condemn the Amnesty Law (MercoPress 2011).
This gives an unusual amount of legitimacy to these regional and international institutions, and
brings tensions between domestic and regional/international laws to the forefront.
3.4 The Inter-American Court on Human Rights Case
From 1982 to the late 1990’s, seventy relatives of kidnapped victims filed reports of
disappearances to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (IACHR). The IACHR took the
case in 2001, under allegations that Brazil had broken the American Convention on Human
Rights by using the Amnesty Law as a ploy to not punish human rights violators of the military
regime (IACHR 2001). More specifically, they claimed violations of rights guaranteed under
Article I (right to life, liberty, and personal security); Article XXV (right of protection from
arbitrary arrest); and Article XXVI (right to due process of law) of the American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man, and of Article 4 (Right to Life); Article 8 (Right to a Fair Trial);
Article 12 (Freedom of Conscience and Religion); Article 13 (Freedom of Thought and
Expression); and Article 25 (Right to Judicial Protection), as well as Article 1(1) (Obligation to
Respect Rights) of the American Convention on Human Rights (IACHR 2001).
In 1996, Brazil tried to mitigate these allegations by establishing o Commissão de
Familiares de Mortos e Desaparecidos Políticos – or the Commission for the Family Members
of the Persons Killed or Disappeared for Political Reasons – which was created to investigate the
crimes committed during the dictatorship and to grant reparations to families who could prove
they were victims of violence (Filho 2012). In 2007, the commission, which relied exclusively
on testimonies provided by the victims, published the report The Right to Memory and to Truth,
accusing “federal agents of rape, torture, executing prisoners, and concealing bodies of victims,”
and noting that “opponents of the regime resorted to bank robberies, kidnappings of foreign
diplomats and attacks on military bases, which it says produced countless victims” (Duffy 2007
as cited in Filho 2012). According to this report, more than 400 people were killed and more than
160 people are believed to have disappeared during the military dictatorship – smaller than those
of Argentina and other neighbors, but still significant numbers (CFMDP 2007).
Brazil paid reparations for the violations to the victims' families, but in enacting Law Nº
9140 in 1995, it was also held responsible for investigating the circumstances and places of the
deaths. Brazil responded that it was only possible to locate the bodies and investigate the
circumstances of the guerrillas' deaths if evidence was available to investigate, but claimed it
lacked such evidence. Brazil asserted that it did not have complete military reports containing the
burial sites of these individuals or the circumstances in which they died, and believed that the
Commission should order the file closed (IACHR 2001).
In 2001, the IACHR ordered the government to investigate “the killing, torture and
disappearance of 70 people, including farmers and members of the Communist Party of Brazil,
during military operations to crush resistance to the dictatorship in the early 1970s” (Filho 2012).
After the 2010 Supreme Court ruling that upheld the law came an outpour of criticism from
human rights and criminal justice organizations once again – especially from the United Nations
(UN) and the IACHR – both of which Brazil is a member. The IACHR issued a landmark ruling
in 2010 denying the legality of the Amnesty law, and expressing once again that maintaining the
Amnesty Law goes against what it believes is the legal direction the continent should be taking.
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In doing so, it hoped to force Brazil to review the Amnesty Law, or reconsider its allegiance to
international accords to which it is a signatory (LAWR 2010).
Although the IACHR increased domestic and international awareness by opposing
Brazil’s Amnesty Law, it by no means had or has jurisdiction over reversing the Supreme Court
decision. It is also noteworthy that there were judges on the court representing Peru, Argentina,
Uruguay, and Chile – all countries that had repealed their amnesty laws and/or underwent human
rights investigations or truth commissions.
4. The Truth Commission
After the Supreme Court upheld the Amnesty Law, pressure mounted to create alternative
measures of overcoming the violent past in Brazil. Two special commissions carried out this
important work – the Dead and Missing Persons Commission (discussed above) and the Truth
Commission. As mentioned in the background section, current Brazilian President Dilma
Rousseff herself was a member of the Communist party and a victim of torture during the
military dictatorship. Her presidency, as well as Lula’s, has been marked with stronger pushes to
investigate human rights abuses during the dictatorship, specifically through the Truth
Commission.
Many former and current military officials and chiefs openly opposed the proposed truth
commission because they saw it as the government’s attempt to get around the Amnesty Law
(Duffy 2010). Rousseff’s commitment to also investigate the armed-resistance side of the
conflict eased military opposition, however, and in November 2011 Rousseff signed Law Nº
12.528, which established the country’s first truth commission. The Commission, which began
work in June of 2012, is composed of seven, presidentially-elected commissioners, all of whom
are Brazilian nationals, and have been recognized as competent and ethical in their work and
conduct. They are also known to have promoted democracy, constitutional institutions, and the
respect for human rights (Ghione 2012). Fourteen staffers accompany the seven commissioners
in investigating the human rights abuses that occurred from 1943 to 1985 (42 years), with only
two years to do so. Brazil’s Truth Commission faces both scarce time and human capacity are;
for reference, the commissions of Argentina and Chile employed at least 60 staffers and covered
a significantly smaller window of time. (Ghione 2012).
Due to the Amnesty Law, the findings of the Commission will not produce any legal
consequences or public hearings, and those responsible for violations are discouraged from
coming forward and providing information. Although the Brazilian military started releasing
documents from the military regime in 2005, only documents dated before 1975 were released2,
with significant restrictions, including omissions of the names of third parties3 (Rohter 2005). To
make matters more difficult, military documents have been difficult to obtain because of the
military’s powerful presence in all branches of the Brazilian government. Even Rousseff
admitted it would be highly naïve to believe that any released documents would name those
responsible for the jailing, torture, and killing of political prisoners (Rohter 2005).
Even with the IACHR’s ruling and the creation of the Truth Commission, the Amnesty
Law and the military’s limited willingness to contribute have created significant obstacles in
obtaining the truth about the military dictatorship in Brazil. For this reason, I ask, does Brazil
have the right to truth? The following sections will review the literature about truth commissions
2
3

Post-1975 records will not be released for another 23 years, according to Rohter (2005).
Third parties refer to the individuals who are not directly related to the people seeking the documents.
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and the right to truth, compare the Brazilian situation to the process in Argentina, and offer
insights on the right to truth.
5. Regional/International Treaty Obligations
In this section, I will explore Brazil’s regional and international obligations in order to
resolve questions of jurisdiction regarding truth commissions and the Amnesty Law, specifically
looking at when Brazil ratified each convention, and which measures the treaty possesses that
relate to the right to truth or address truth commissions. According to Geneva Academy (2012),
Brazil is party to all major humanitarian and human rights treaties without any reservations. The
table below lists the commitments specific to the military dictatorship and the right to truth.
Table 1: Brazil’s Regional and International Treaty Obligations
Treaty
Main Points
Accession4 or Ratification5
Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (UN)

Article VII (against torture);
Article XIV (equal before
the courts)

International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights
(UN)

Article XV (cant prosecute
Jan 24, 1992
something that wasn’t illegal
under domestic law, can’t
prevent from prosecuting
something that was illegal
under law during time)
Article I (right to life,
April 1948
liberty, and personal
security); Article XXV (right
of protection from arbitrary
arrest); and Article XXVI
(right to due process of law)
Article I (Obligation to
August 1997
Respect Rights); Article IV
(right to life); Article VIII
(right to a fair trial); Article
XII (freedom of conscience
and religion); Article XIII
(freedom of thought and
expression); and Article

American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man
(OAS)

American Convention on
Human Rights
(IACHR)

Sept 28, 1989

4

Accession is the act whereby a state accepts the offer or the opportunity to become a party to a treaty already
negotiated and signed by other states. It has the same legal effect as ratification. Accession usually occurs after the
treaty has entered into force (Oxford 1990).
5 Ratification is an act by which a State signifies an agreement to be legally bound by the terms of a particular
treaty. To ratify a treaty, the State first signs it and then fulfills its own national legislative requirements. Once the
appropriate national organ of the country – Parliament, Senate, the Crown, Head of State or Government, or a
combination of these – follows domestic constitutional procedures and makes a formal decision to be a party to the
treaty (Oxford 1990).
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XXV (right to judicial
protection)
Source: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/ratification-brazil.html
As demonstrated above, all of the international and regional treaties pertaining to the
military dictatorship and right to truth were signed after the 1979 Amnesty Law, except for the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Thus the question arises of whether
Amnesty Law precedes the jurisdiction of most of the treaties, or whether the adoption of the
treaties implies the unconstitutionality of the Amnesty Law. Either way, it is difficult to make an
argument for the right to truth using regional and international treaties that lack an explicit right
to truth. The treaties, along with countries in the region setting precedent by following the
treaties, act merely as “peer pressure” on Brazil to denounce the Amnesty Law. Only in Brazil
did the Amnesty Law seem to have the effect of actually impeding trials; among the sixteen
countries that have enacted amnesty laws, fifteen have successfully undertaken human rights
trials (Melo 2012).
6. Argentina as an Example
Brazil is the latest country to establish a truth commission, following international lead
from countries such as South Africa, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe, and Chad, as well as regional
precedents from Argentina, Chile, Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay, and Guatemala. In order to gain
insight on Brazil’s difficulty with establishing an effective Truth Commission, I will compare
Brazil’s experience to that of the Argentine Truth Commission. I will summarize the military
dictatorship in Argentina, and will draw from Cuevas et al (2002) to illuminate key factors that
distinguish the Argentine case. I will point out the differences between the two countries’
experiences with a truth commission, and ultimately discuss implicit obstacles to Brazil’s truth
commission.
6.1 The Truth Commission in Argentina
Towards the end of its dictatorial regime in Argentina, Military Junta faced an economic
crisis, social mobilization (the most famous being Madres de plaza de mayo), international
pressure, and military defeat. As a result, the military regime negotiated transition to civilian
power in 1982, a process that included a military-civilian pact. Raúl Alfonsín was democratically
elected president on December 10, 1983, and a few days later he announced the establishment of
the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP) – appointed to
investigate and report on cases of disappearances between March 24, 1976 and the democratic
elections of December 1993. Cuevas et al (2002) maintains that the establishment of the
CONADEP was due to international and national pressure, obligations under human rights and
humanitarian law, as well as the demand to legitimize the new democratic order.
Although the government granted the CONADEP full access to documents, files,
interviews, and sites, specifications in its mandate created barriers for officials to testify. On
September 20, 1984 the Commission presented its result confidentially to the President, with
thousands of citizens outside on the Plaza del Mayo. The final report, titled “Nunca Mas” (or
Never Again), included names of the perpetrators, and indicated 8,690 cases of disappearances,
the existence of 340 detention centers, and provided evidence of coordination of repression in
Latin America. One month after the president received the report, it was published for the public.
While the CONADEP only had investigative and reporting duties – leaving the responsibility of
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finding guilt/innocence to the judiciary – the report included recommendations on how to
transmit investigations to the judiciary branch. “Nunca Mas” is still one of the most read
documents today, impacting generations both new and old (Cuevas et al 2002).
The military-civilian pact during the transition to democracy eventually resulted in the
Amnesty Laws of 1986 and 1987. These laws, along with the 1986 Full Stop Law (which set
deadlines for Courts to complete investigations on human rights violations) and the 1987 Law of
Due Obedience (which instructed judges to apply the principle of due obedience to all officers
below the rank of colonel and close any pending cases against them), protected officials and their
subordinates from prosecution (Amnesty 1995). Thus, the public report did not include names of
perpetrators, but alternatively did create a pathway for those military officials that did not
participate in crimes to clear their name and honor. As such, civilians benefitted from finding out
what happened to the disappeared persons and received monetary reparations, but did not receive
the satisfaction of discovering the perpetrators of the crime. The IACHR-imposed reparations
were intended to satiate the thirst for justice; most civilians, however, sought justice in the form
of recognition of truth (Cuevas et al 2002).
6.2 Lessons from the Argentine Example
Although both Brazil and Argentina have undergone military dictatorships, there are key
distinctions in their experiences that influenced their respective truth commissions. For one, the
number of people affected in Argentina largely outnumbered that of Brazil – 160 alleged
disappearances in Brazil compared to 8,690 confirmed cases in Argentina (CFMDP 2007,
Cuevas et al 2002). These numbers help explain why civilian demand for a truth commission was
so great in Argentina relative to that of Brazil; the number of people it affected encouraged an
active and powerful opposition that mobilized to topple the military government (Mainwaring
1986).
One of the largest and most well-known human rights activist and advocacy groups in
Argentina was Madres de plaza de mayo, an association of Argentine mothers whose children
disappeared during the military dictatorship between 1976-1983. Every Thursday for more than a
decade, they would protest in front of the government house, calling for more investigations and
the release of names. In January 2006 they had their last march, claiming that the enemy wasn’t
the government anymore. This was largely due to President Néstor Kirchner’s push to declare
the Full Stop Law and the Law of Due Obedience as unconstitutional (Madres 2012, Amnesty
1995). The group is just one example of the powerful civilian movements that demanded the
CONADEP, and continues to actively seek missing children, as well as pressure the government
to do so.
Second, the period of military rule in Brazil was longer than that of Argentina, and was
marked by much economic growth. This created many conflicts of interest among important
political actors. It also happened that leaders of dictatorship in Brazil orchestrated, and stayed in
power through, the transition to democracy, due to their relative strength rather than weakness,
as was the case in Argentina (Mainwaring 1986). Third, the proximity of the end of the
dictatorship to the creation of the truth commission in Argentina capitalized on raw emotions and
desires for justice among civilians. The fact that Brazil is just beginning its truth commission
more than 25 years after the end of the dictatorship accounts for the lack of momentum and
demand. While in Argentina left-wing initiatives were able to gain power, the right wing regime
defeated and overpowered similar movements in Brazil.
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From this comparison, it is clear that what Brazil lacks is the incredible demand for an
effective truth commission by civilians – as was present in Argentina. The following sections
will discuss the possible way to address the ineffective Truth Commission and the right to truth
in Brazil, and will present the implications of such solutions.
7. Possible Approaches and their Implications
If Brazil is to continue on its current trajectory with a Truth Commission of limited
capacity and institutional support, there is little hope that the Commission will come away with
the desired results. The military still holds ample power in Brazil, and will create obstacles by
blocking access to its documents and citing the Amnesty Law when international organizations
try to impose rulings. However, Brazil can hope that by creating a truth commission, it has
asserted itself as a legitimate democracy, and will encourage other countries to pursue truth and
reconciliation processes. Outlined below are other approaches that Brazil can take to alleviate the
issues facing the Truth Commission – specific to the Amnesty Law and to creating demand
among civilians.
7.1 What can be done about the amnesty law?
Filho (2012) believes that President Rousseff needs to proclaim the IACHR ruling as law,
and institute a compromise between the Brazilian and IACHR stances: individualized amnesty.
This means that the government would not prosecute state agents or members of the resistance as
long as they cooperate with the work of the commission. Those that do not come forward,
however, could be prosecuted. Individualization of amnesty has the following benefits: incentive
to speak, informal punishment, and focus on the survivor (Filho 2012). Individualized amnesty
would encourage guilty parties to come forward and reveal the truth with the incentive of not
being formally punished. They would, however, suffer an informal punishment from society in
general, as a result of knowing the truth about these individuals. This “informal social sanction”
can ensure that perpetrators face some penalty for their past actions. Finally, this sort of amnesty
law would focus on finding the truth for the individuals and families affected, benefitting the
victims rather than singling out those at fault.
This strategy would benefit the Truth Commission and help the victims come to terms
with the past, but could have controversial implications for the relationship between the IACHR
and the government of Brazil. Taking the IACHR ruling as law would suggest the superiority of
regional/international law over domestic law, creating a risky precedent for future disputes.
Another approach would be to adhere to Amnesty Law, Supreme Court ruling, and the
military stance against the Commission, and focus on how to address present and future human
rights abuses, rather than dwell on past abuses through the Truth Commission. This would entail
the creation of more targeted human rights law, outlining protocols in the case of abuses, as well
as measures to prevent future amnesty laws from passing.
7.2 Civilian Demand Approach
The two approaches outlined above, while arguably practical, are very passive, and will
not bring truth and justice to the people of Brazil. A more progressive approach would take
lessons learned from Argentina’s experience to stimulate civilian consciousness of the abuses
carried out during the dictatorship, in order to encourage demand for an effective truth
commission. A small scale example of this exists at the Universidade de Santa Catarina in
Florianópolis, Brazil: o Memorial dos Direitos Humanos (MDH) created a website with

11
Published by DigitalCommons@Macalester College, 2013

11

The Macalester Review, Vol. 3 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 8

timelines, updates, and a bibliography of academic literature, periodicals, news articles, and
websites with the military dictatorship and Truth Commission as the subject matter – the first of
its kind in Brazil (MDH 2012). MDH also ran a campaign on campus in 2012 to raise awareness
about the abuses during the military dictatorship, in light of the official creation of the Truth
Commission in Brazil.
The success of this campaign on campus was astounding – large turnouts at events were
complemented by increased cognizance of the military regime. While this was effective on a
small scale, there is a need for such campaigns at a large scale through government education
programs and advertising campaigns. Although President Rousseff’s generation lived through
the dictatorship, they were not as affected on an individual and personal level as were people in
Argentina. Younger generations now are almost completely removed from the dictatorship.
Consequently there is little demand for the right to truth, and thus a proportional response from
the government – aside from Rousseff. But, this is not Rousseff’s fight; it is the fight of the
Brazilian people, not just for truth, but also for true democracy.
8. Conclusion: Does Brazil have the right to truth?
In order to proceed as an emerging world power, Brazil will need to take fair and
effective measures to uncover what happened during the military dictatorship. Brazil can learn a
lot from the experiences of Argentina, both on the procedural and civilian side. I suggest that
Brazil does have the right to truth; it will only be acknowledged, however, if there is sufficient
civilian demand.
First, Brazil needs to frame ‘the right to truth’ not as the right to publish all the names of
perpetrators, but as freedom of information (Melo 2012). Thus the Commission would not focus
so much on the investigation and punishment of human rights violators, but rather on the victims.
Second, Brazil needs to limit the scope of the Truth Commission, and take steps to meet the full
right to truth. Because of the strong military presence in Brazil’s government, the Truth
Commission should begin by following Argentina’s lead in only searching for disappearances
during the military regime and only publicly releasing the victims’ names and whereabouts. This
would ease the military’s reservations about the Truth Commission, give the Commission more
information, and thus bring a certain extent of closure to the families and friends of victims.
Third, Brazil needs to engage its civilian population in the process through educational
campaigns – for there can be no ‘right to truth’ without the demand for it. To echo Melo’s (2012)
sentiments, the truth is not only an individual right of victims; it is a collective right of society,
thus the society in its entirety must fight for truth.
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